Edited by Amanda Kostek
Last week’s Court Rulings from the Alberta Court of King’s Bench, Court of Appeal and SCC.
RK v GSG, 2026 ABKB 647
Costs Awards
Jonk v Mercier, 2026 ABKB 674
Costs Awards
Valentine v Omeasoo (Estate), 2026 ABKB 608
MVA | Passenger’s Failure to sue Driver | Issues related to Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund
RK v GSG, 2026 ABKB 647
In RK v GSG, 2026 ABKB 647, the Court directed that the primary objective of costs awards are to provide a reasonable measure of indemnity, and can also serve policy objective like discouraging unnecessary actions, and sanctioning poor conduct. Costs are discretionary, and the overriding concern is proportionality keeping in mind the amount of the claim and the importance of the issue. Costs awards consist of “entitlement, scale, and quantum.” On interlocutory matters, the court favoured “costs in the cause” approach.
In this case a formal offer was issued, and under Rule 4.29(2) this created a prima facie entitlement to increased costs. It was noted that a minimally better result than the offer was obtained, and double costs after the service of the offer would result in a disproportionate award. However, in light of the policy underlying Rule 4.24 the court concluded that there was an entitlement to double costs, and steps taken after the offer was issued attracted double costs.
Jonk v Mercier, 2026 ABKB 674
In Jonk v Mercier, 2026 ABKB 674, following trial the Court, in weighing argument on costs, noted that neither party was substantially successful and each had mixed success. Each took unreasonable positions, and reckless or dishonest testimony by one party was offset by that same party’s genuine attempt to avoid trial with a bona fide offer. On this basis, it was appropriate for each party to bear their own costs.
Valentine v Omeasoo (Estate), 2026 ABKB 608
In Valentine v Omeasoo (Estate), 2026 ABKB 608, the Plaintiff, Eva was making a left hand turn when her vehicle was struck by an unknown vehicle. Both Eva, and her sister, Parisa, brought a single personal injury claim together and sued only MVAC. The SEF 44 insurer was also sued, and it obtained an accident reconstruction report that concluded that Eva was at least partly liable for the collision. As a result, new counsel for Parisa brought an Application to remove Parisa from the original claim brought with her sister and issue a new action on the basis that it was not until service of the expert report that the passenger knew she had a claim against her sister. Problematically, the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims fund’s defence plead liability on the part of Eva approximately 4.5 year prior to the accident reconstruction report. This was dismissed by an Applications Judge. On appeal, the Court concluded that the accident reconstruction report was merely an opinion, and was therefore irrelevant in terms of determining discoverability. The Court directed that even “if Parisa could be excused for not bringing a claim against Eva and Fatima at first instance, the filing of the Statement of Defence by the Administrator on May 14th, 2019, changed everything.” The Defence put Eva’s conduct in issue, which was “clearly discoverable.” As a result, the proposed amendments were statute barred under Section 3 of the Limitations Act, and Section 6 of the Limitations Act was not intended for these circumstances. The Court further concluded that it would be prejudicial for Eva to now have to defend a claim by her passenger 9 years after the collision.