Edited by Amanda Kostek
Last week’s Court Rulings from the Alberta Court of King’s Bench, Court of Appeal and SCC.
Samra v. Houle, 2025 ABKB 24
Personal Injury Damages
Yang v Freed, 2024 ABKB 763
Medical Malpractice
Villezcas v Mann, 2024 ABKB 752
Motor Vehicle Liability Trial
LAPP Corporation v Alberta, 2025 ABKB 33
Excessive Costs Claims
Samra v. Houle, 2025 ABKB 24
The Plaintiff suffered a left ankle dislocation and fracture, facial fracture, broken nose requiring surgery, ongoing sleep issues, and psychological issues as a result of a vicious assault. The Plaintiff was a student enrolled in the Bachelor of Commerce program at MacEwan University at the time. As a result of his injuries his studies were delayed 1 year. He graduated in 2017 and attempted law school in the UK, but left after 1 year. He believed that his injuries were the reason he did not complete law school. He instead enrolled in the Automotive Service Technician course at NAIT and worked at his family’s automotive business, but he did not complete the program. His evidence is that but for the collision he would have completed law school, and started articling in 2020. He deposed that he had not worked a steady job since 2020 and had not earned significant income since 2017. His income tax returns disclosed the following:
- 2014: $24,400.00
- 2015: $37,087.02
- 2016: $17,703.00
- 2018: $17,703.00
- 2019: $5,960.64
- 2020: $17,000.82.
The Court did not accept that but for the injury, the Plaintiff would have completed lawschool:
[96] In the circumstances, I have difficulty accepting that but for the Assault, Mr. Samra would have completed a law degree and practiced as a lawyer. It is clear that many other factors were at play when Mr. Samra decided to withdraw from law school. Having to deal with the grief of losing four family members and a dear pet over a 12-month period would be very difficult for anyone to deal with and it would not be surprising that these events would have significantly impacted Mr. Samra and his ability to focus at school. Further, Mr. Samra testified to feeling lonely and being affected by the time difference.
[97] Given that Mr. Samra was able to focus enough to successfully meet the demands of his initial post-secondary degree post-accident, in my view, it is more likely than not, that these other factors of the multiple deaths in his family and his loneliness in being at school abroad were the operative factors in his inability to focus and continue with the program. Accordingly, to use the words of Devlin J. in Camacho, I am not satisfied that Mr. Samra’s injuries arising from the Assault impacted the overall probability of him working as a lawyer to a compensable degree.
[98] I note further that, unlike several of the cases cited above, I do not have the benefit of any functional capacity report or any economic expert report in assessing loss of earning capacity. There is no expert evidence to suggest that Mr. Samra’s injuries would have limited his ability to become a lawyer, or, indeed, to engage in any other type of work.
Damages were assessed as follows:
- General damages of $75,000.00;
- Interest on general damages of $29,250.00
- Damages for loss of earning capacity of $150,000.00;
- Loss of past housekeeping damages of $15,440.00;
- Loss of future housekeeping damages of $30,080.89;
- Damages for the cost of future care of $5,000.00;
- Punitive damages of $5,000.00;
- Costs of $7,331,66. Additional disbursements + GST may be added to the costs total as set out above.
- His Majesty the King in Right of Alberta (Alberta Health) is awarded damages of $14,728.16.
Yang v Freed, 2024 ABKB 763
Ms. Liu arrived at the University Hospital in respiratory distress, and died 10 days later during a cardiac procedure to address her mitral valve. At issue was whether her treating physicians properly applied the concept of a differential diagnosis. The Case provides an extensive summary of the law on standard of care in the medical malpractice context as well as discussing expert opinions in the context of establishing the appropriate standard of care. Notwithstanding that one expert had 28 years of experience, the Court preferred the evidence of Dr. Ovakim, who had 12 years experience even though the more senior expert had more regular exposure to complex and severely ill patients. The Court found the more senior expert’s opinion to be less reliable, because his testimony approached advocacy. The Court concluded that both defendant doctors met their standard of care with respect to the differential diagnosis. Their focus in treating the patient was to attend to her most immediate health concerns, and keep her alive. This focus was not to the exclusion of other diagnosis. Both doctors intended to explore cardiac issues further once she stabilized. However, the Court concluded that the defendant doctors should have ordered a TTE test. As a result, they breached their standard of care in respect of this diagnostic tool, but the evidence fell short of establishing that this would have changed the outcome. The claim was dismissed.
Villezcas v Mann, 2024 ABKB 752
At issue was whether the reverse onus provisions in Section 186 of the Traffic Safety Act applied to a collision between a vehicle and a bicycle.
Section 186 of the TSA provides:
186(1) If a person sustains loss or damage by reason of a motor vehicle being in motion, the onus of proof in any civil proceeding that the loss or damage did not entirely or solely arise through the negligence or improper conduct of the owner or driver of the motor vehicle is on that owner or driver.
(2) This section does not apply in the case of an accident between motor vehicles on a highway.
(3) In this section, “motor vehicle” includes a self‑propelled implement of husbandry.
The Court concluded that these provisions did apply, because a bicycle was excluded from the definition of a motor vehicle.
In terms of damages, the Plaintiff sought the cap amount for soft tissue injuries to the wrist, but wanted an additional $15,000 for a contusion to the thigh, because the Minor Injury Regulation definition did not include bruises. In addition, the Plaintiff testified that 2 years post collision although most of the symptoms had largely resolved, he still had anxiety and stress. On this basis, the Court granted the additional request of $15,000 in addition to the cap amount.
It appears that the defendant did not have counsel and represented himself.
LAPP Corporation v Alberta, 2025 ABKB 33
At issue was whether the amount plead in the Statement of Claim affected the costs payable for an interim application that did not raise any monetary issues. In this case, the claim asserted a loss of $1.3 billion. The application before the court was whether Alberta should be added as a necessary party to the arbitration. The Plaintiff sought $190,576.29 in costs, which was 50% of what was actually paid to their counsel, or alternatively Column 5 costs of $147,100 with a multiplier of 5. Alberta took the position that only the Column 5 tariff set out in Schedule C to the Rules of Court applied, but they were prepared to agree to a multiplier of 1.25 to account for inflation.
The Court sided with Alberta, noting that it was not enough to show how much was spent without some gauge of the reasonableness. In this case Ontario counsel billed over $83,000 to draft the application and affidavit in support, four lawyers collectively billed in excess of $220,000 to draft the brief and authorities, and 3 lawyers billed over $23,000 to attend the 1 day application. Billing did not break down who did what task and for how long, and there was insufficient information to assess the reasonableness of the time spent. The Court concluded that directing even a percentage of solicitor client costs was not appropriate on the follwiogn basis:
[16] In other words, to quote McAllister (para 60), no or at least inadequate information concerning the “manner in which the services were provided” and “whether the work was being done by lawyers of appropriate seniority.”
[17] As well, a party seeking solicitor-client costs (or some percentage) has to include that information as part of its costs submissions: Ho v Lau, 2023 ABKB 15 at paras 39-51.
The Court noted that Alberta could have made a strong argument for Column 1 costs, but given the consensus that Column 5 applied, the Court was prepared to apply it:
[36] Alberta could have made a forceful argument for Column 1, given the entirely procedural (“venue”) focus of the application (as explained above) and Clarke v Bean not governing the “amount” point, as discussed above. (Success for Alberta here would have kept it out of the arbitration, but not erased its (possible) exposure to the Funds’ claims.)
[37] However, given consensus on Column 5, that column will govern here.
The Court analysed the cases dealing with multipliers on costs awards and noted that none of the cases featured a purely procedural dispute where no monetary amounts were in dispute as was the case here. Although the Plaintiff suggested that the case was complex, the Court disagreed and said the following:
[51] Alberta’s characterization (“not complex”) is more accurate:
The subject of the application was determination of a legal question, the litigation proceedings were not lengthy or complex (filing of an affidavit without examination, written briefs of [23.5 and 17.5] pages [Funds’ and Alberta’s, respectively,] and a one-day hearing); this application was comparable to a routine or ordinary judicial-review application ….
As a result, the Court was not prepared to award a multiplier, except as acknowledged by Alberta for inflation.
Finally, excessive photocopying was disallowed as were the claimed amounts for transcripts, since no transcripts were filed for the application.